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Abstract- This paper investigates borrowing decisions 
of rural households from a microfinance in Tigray, 
Ethiopia using household panel data on 5 years and 
a  dynamic  panel  probit  model.  The  theoretical 
model  takes  two  types  of  risk involved  in  joint-
liability  lending  explicitly  into  account:  risk  of 
partner failure and the risk of losing future access to 
credit.  Empirical  results  show  that  these  risks  are 
important  in  explaining borrowing  decisions. 
Another  finding  is  that  the  probability  of  repeat-
borrowing  is  higher  than  the  probability  of  new 
participation,  with  possible  implications  that 
perceived  joint-liability  threats  deter  participation 
and easing stringent punishments might help poor 
households’ access  to credit.  
 




The microfinance revolution is hailed for its innovative 
approaches to mitigate classical incentive problems that 
hinder lending, in poor rural areas. One most celebrated 
approach in microfinance is the joint-liability contract 
often combined with some dynamic incentives involved 
in borrowing [1]. The approach requires borrowers to 
form  self-selected  groups  in  which  they  are  jointly 
responsible  for  a  group  loan.  In  most  microfinance 
institutions  (MFIs),  while  successful  borrowers  are 
successively  rewarded  with  increased  loan  amounts, 
strategic defaulters, at times including their village, are 
punished  by  denying  future  access  to  credit.  This  is 
believed to help lenders, even those operating in poor 
remote  villages,  by  inducing  borrowers  to  use  local 
information and discipline their partners in repayment. 
Several  theoretical  papers  appeal  to  efficiency  and 
aggregate  welfare  gains  from  this  design  [2]. 
Microfinance  has  thus  convinced  donors  and 
governments on its potential to solve the credit access 
problem for the poor. As a result, microfinance is seen 
as  a  key  policy  ingredient  of  poor  countries,  such  as 
Ethiopia,  where  considerable  amount  of  government  as 
well as donor resources have been devoted in the last two 
decades [3].  
A  major  assumption  in  most  theoretical  work  that 
emphasize on aggregate (social) efficiency gains from the 
new approaches in microfinance is that potential borrowers 
are risk-neutral and optimize over their expected incomes, 
regardless of contractual risks associated with joint-liability 
and subsequent lose of future access to credit. Aggregate 
gains  from  borrower  disciplining  are  often  considered 
under  static  incentive  and  participation  constraints  and 
without due regard to dynamic effects  of contractual risks 
on  long-term  individual  borrower  decisions  under 
uncertainty,  given  the  risk  environments  under  which 
borrowers operate. 
Given  access  to  joint-liability  credit,  an  important 
empirical  question  is  if  such  contractual  risks  matter  for 
households to participate in borrowing given the uncertain 
environment they operate in. With the intricate workings of 
the contract and its dynamic incentives in one hand and the 
erratic  economic  environment  under  which  borrowers 
operate on the other, the contractual risk involved and its 
dynamic  interplay  with  other  household  variables  may 
matter more than physical availability of credit. Empirical 
evidence on the performance of MFIs, and particularly with 
regard  to  contractual  risk  considerations  of  borrowing  is 
however scarce mainly due to rigorous data requirements or 
evidences  are  too  localized  and  mixed  [4].  This  paper 
studies  farm  households’  borrowing  decisions  in  rural 
Ethiopia,  where  the  risk  involved  in  the  joint-liability 
contract and the risk of losing future access to credit are 
explicitly  taken  into  account.  A  five-wave  panel  data 
spanning over ten years of two-year interval (1997-2006) 
from 402 borrowing and non-borrowing farm households is 
used.  Results  from  dynamic  probit  indicate  that,  other 
things  remaining  the  same,  contractual  risk  and  weights 
given to future access to credit matter for participation in 
risky  environments  where  production  is  subject  to  the 
vagaries of nature and consumption variability after a shock 
is  not  insured.  A  full-fledged  set  of  financial  products, 
including  credit  for  consumption  might  be  essential  to insure ex-post production risk. Section 2 develops the 
theoretical  framework.  Section  3  and  4  present  the 
empirical model, estimation approach and data. Section 
5 summarizes the results and section 6 concludes. 
 
II. JOINT-LIABILITY LENDING  AND INTERTEMPORAL 
HOUSEHOLD BORROWING DECISIONS 
 
Consider household i  with endowment 
t W  and access 
to  a  joint-liability  based  MFI.  Assume  no  strategic 
interactions between borrowers and that a borrower is 
willing to repay if able. The MFI forgives defaults it 
consider  as  non-strategic.  Nevertheless,  MFIs  are 
imperfectly  informed  about  borrowers’  income 
realizations  and  may  mistakenly  punish  non-strategic 
defaults. This occurs with probability t . Households’ 
value of future access to credit, v, is part of their welfare 
valuations. Let i  and j  form contract  ) , ( c r ij= , where 
r  is interest payment and  c is the joint-liability.  
Two  ex  ante  contractual  outcomes  influence 
borrowing: (1) conditional on own success, the contract 
entails an extra risk of partners’ default; (2) conditional 
on  being  declared  strategic  default,  borrowers  are 
subject to lifetime credit access punishment. However, 
the contract brings symmetrical benefits to partners. So, 
assessing  the  contractual  risk  effect  is  not 
straightforward. To clarify, suppose the MFI disburses 
loan to the group where i ’s share is 
it L . Given shocks, 
household  i ’s  probability  of  success  S   is  p , 
otherwise  F  with prob. p - 1 . Possible states of ij are 
} , , , { FF FS SF SS ,  which  occur,  respectively,  when 
i and  j  succeed (prob. 
j i p p ), when  i  and  j  fail 
(prob.  ) 1 )( 1 ( j i p p - - ), and when  i  succeeds but  j  
fails  (prob.  ) 1 ( j t p p - )  and  vice-versa.  i ’s  income 
realization  less  of  stochastic  repayment 
it it L r R ) 1 ( 1 + = +  introduces income risk.  
Borrowing  decisions  are  related  to 
(intertemporal)  production,  consumption  and  wealth 
accumulation. A budget identity relating consumption 
(Ct),  Wt  and  investment  (xt)  and  subsistence 
consumption (C ) is:    
 
C x W C t t t ³ - = , and  t t W x < < 0                         (1)  
 
In  the  absence  of  credit,  (1)  is  binding,  dictating 
households 1. to deplete its productive endowments in 
bad  years  and  2.  to  seek  for  external  finance  if 
additional  investment  is  required.  Borrowing  relaxes  the 
budget  through  its  liquidity  effect  in  year  t  as  well  as 
through  additional  productivity  gains  of  x,  which  affects 
endowments  in  next  periods.  This  makes  borrowing  a 
dynamic variable bridging liquidity gaps between periods. 
The  decision  to  borrow  is  therefore  evaluated  in  a 
stochastic  dynamic  framework  that  falls  into  the  general 
family of optimal stopping problems [5]. With borrowing 
option  Z,  the  household  maximizes  time  separable  well-
behaved  utility  (.) U   derived  from  consumption,  which 
can be summarized by a Bellman equation:   
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The value function  ( ) t t t t Z v W V , ,  is the maximum 
attainable value of current and expected lifetime rewards.  
(.)
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utilities if the household borrows B Z =  or does not 
borrow  NB Z =  defined as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 ) , ( , , ; ,
+ + + +
+ + +
+ - + + - =
+ =
t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
B
t
v R Y EV L x W U
v W V E Z v C U Z v W V
b
b                                                                                                        
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
,
) , ( , ,
+ + + +
+ + +
+ - + - =
+ =
t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
NB
t
v R Y EV v x W U
v W V E v C U v W V
b
b
                                               
                                                                                  (3) 
b  is the discount factor, E is the expectation operator, and 
Y is income, which under the stochastic realization of two 
states is redefined as maximum  Y  and Y  and minimum 
y  and   y , with and without borrowing respectively. Due 
to  additional  contractual  risk,  we  assume,  y Y >   and 
y Y < .  Substituting  E    by  respective  probabilities  and 
writing the joint-liability substituting for  1 + t R : 
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                                                                                                                     The household participates in borrowing if 
NB B V V ³ . 
The difference compares utility from borrowing today 
and discounted expected flow of future effects against 
not borrowing today and avoiding the stochastic income 
flow in the future.  
 
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ESTIMATION  
 
Based  on  the  theoretical  model  a  latent  variable 
‘tendency to borrow’ Zit is defined and modelled as a 
dynamic random effect (RE) Probit model:  
 
( ) 0 1
'
1 ³ + + + = - it i it it it x Z Z e a b g                      (5) 
( T t N i ,..., 1 ; ,..., 1 = = ) 
  (5) 
Zit=B   as defined before,  it x  is a vector of regressors 
determined in (4), Zit-1 is lagged independent implicit in 
the  endowment  transition;  b ,g ,  a ,  and  e   are 
parameters  to  estimate  where 
i a   is  time-invariant 
individual  heterogeneity  and 
it e   is  the  error  term. 
Identification  requires  assumptions  on  the  initial 
conditions  problem  as  well  as  autocorrelation,  which 
render  ML  estimation  of  RE  probit  model  difficult. 
Following Stewart [6], we estimate the Heckman model 
[7], using maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) which 
solves  both  initial  conditions  and  extends  it  to  the 
autocorrelation problem to simulate the integrals based 
on  the  GHK  algorithm.  A  first-order  autoregressive 
error structure is considered. 
 
IV. MICROFINANCE IN ETHIOPIA AND DATA USED 
 
The panel data used comes from 402 randomly selected 
rural households in Tigray, northern Ethiopia, observed  
over  five  years  (1997-2006).  Tigray  is  located  in  the 
semi-arid zone of the Sub-Sahara belt. Erratic rainfall, 
decades  of  civil-war  and  conflicts,  coupled  with 
overpopulation severely degraded its natural resources 
and  characterize  its  subsistence  rural  economy, 
generally  classified  as  food-deficient.  Smallholder 
agriculture,  the  main  stay  of  775  thousand  rural 
household, is unpredictable and subject to the vagaries 
of  nature  hard  felt  by  inhabitants.  Efforts to  increase 
productivity by introducing new technologies such as 
high-yielding crops and fertilizer are often hindered by 
income  shocks  because  formal  insurance  schemes  to 
smooth  consumption  after  shock  are  absent  and 
informal risk-sharing is limited. Food aid and ‘cash-for-
work’ safety nets are instituted recently to insure against 
income shocks.  
A recent effort to rehabilitate the region included the 
provision  of  financial  services  to  farmers.  The  Dedebit 
Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) is one of biggest and 
pioneer MFI in Ethiopia operating in the region providing 
working  capital  credit  to  smallholder  farmers  that  are 
literally out of the horizons of traditional banking. DECSI 
started  in  1994  and  expanded  from  67,057  to  nearly 
424,000 borrowers and average loan size from USD 111 to 
USD 217 between 1997 and 2006, encroaching to almost 
all parts of the region. Lending interest rate ranges between 
12.5  and 15  per  cent  per  year,  one  of  the  lowest  in  the 
world.  Maximum  loan  size  is  5000  ETB  (close  to  USD 
500). Loan duration ranges 1-2 years.  
DECSI  followed  a  Grameen  style  joint-liability 
credit contract and implemented it in its stricter sense. A 
credit  application  is  made  by  group  of  3-7  self-selected 
borrowers screened by credit committee composed of credit 
officers and local officials. Initially, DECSI started with a 
criteria of owning “at least two-oxen” for credit eligibility 
but has never been implemented strictly (Mees, 2000). If 
approved, individually requested amounts are awarded for 
which they become responsible as a group and repayment 
is  strictly  made  conditional  on  full-group  amount.  Any 
thing less is considered default and consequently, all group 
members, some times even their village, is denied of future 
credit. In some instances, contrary to the ‘limited liability’ 
assumption in the microfinance literature, DECSI followed 
a policy of tracking down defaulters to jail or local courts 
regardless of realized outcome, in which case local leaders 
play a role. DECSI enjoys the benevolence of local leaders 
because its credit services are often synchronized with the 
state’s extension programs. The latter made the perceived 
threat  of  future  access  to  credit  more  stringent  and 
borrowing decision more difficult. 
Sample  households  include  those  that  borrowed 
repeatedly, those that participated at least once but dropped 
out,  and  those  that  never  participated  over  the  years. 
Besides,  the  initial  survey  contains  some  pre-survey 
information  regarding  borrowing  and  household 
characteristics.  The  proportion  of  borrowers  joining  the 
MFI has slightly increased from 1997 to 2002 but declined 
in  2004,  again  with  a  slight  increase  between  2004  and 
2006, modestly approximating trend in the population. The 
highest percentage of dropouts was in the year 2002-04, 
perhaps, due to the major draught occurred in 2003 in the 
country.  When  asked  ‘why  a  household  decided  not  to 
borrow while there was a need for credit’, majority (59 %) 
of  them  reported  had  feared  failure  to  repay  and  sliding 
down into debt-trap. Very few of them reported had other sources of credit. Descriptive information summarizing 
the above statistics can be obtained from the authors. 
 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Results of the reduced form Heckman model estimated 
by dynamic RE probit model with AR(1) using MSL 
for the t>1 period variables of interest are reported. For 
comparison, the same model is estimated using pooled 
probit and simple dynamic random effect probit. The 
Heckman  model  is  also  estimated  with  and  without 
autocorrelation.  The  simulated  model  is  run  with 
number of replications R= 150. All results are in the 
table  below.  The  estimate  for  lagged  dependent  is 
significant  in  all  models  confirming  the  need  for  the 
dynamic specification. A significant lagged dependent 
means  those  who  at  least  borrowed  once  are  likely  to 
borrow again (state dependence). Results show, compared 
to  other  estimators,  the  pooled  estimate  for  the  lagged 
dependent  is  larger  than  estimates  all  other  models  and  
with comparable significance level to the simple RE as well 
as Heckman with no autocorrelation, but more significant 
than  Heckman  model  with  autocorrelation.  As  expected, 
after making the required normalization, all other pooled 
estimates are (in absolute value) smaller than the estimates 
of  the  other  three  models.  The  random  effect  estimator 
results in reduction in the estimate for the lagged dependent 
compared to the pooled, especially when the normalization 
is  taken  into  account  but  still  higher  than  when 
autocorrelation is allowed. Most other parameter estimates 
of the simple random effect estimator are comparable to the 
Heckman model with no autocorrelation but greater than 
the Heckman estimates with autocorrelation.  
 
Table 1.  Dynamic probit estimates of participation in joint-liability borrowing 
 
Variable names   Description  Pooled  
(probit) 
Simple RE  
(xtprobit) 
MSL RE  
(no auto) 
MSL RE 
AR (1), R=150 
  t > 1  ) . ( err std b   ) . ( err std b   ) . ( err std b   ) . ( err std b  








hhage  Age of household head (years)  .0455*  
(0.0245) 
0.0490* 













oxen  Number of oxen    -.0062 
 (0.0506) 
-0.0117   
(0.0535) 












mrkt  Proximity to nearest market  .3337*** 
 (0.1034) 
0.3430***  
(.1117)      






1 if affected by war   -.4726***  
(.1719) 
-.5029*** 

















1 if never participated in extension by choice   .3012***  
(0.0932) 
-.3318***  







1 if other sources of credit were available  -0.0361  
(0.1029) 
-.0328  





Shock_id  If  shock  (death  of  animals,  poor  yield,  death  of 
household head) occurred in the year 
-4.89e-06  
(0.1032) 




  t=1 (initial cond.)         
crdt_exp  1 if experienced borrowing before the first survey  0.7712*** 
(0.2794) 




Lnhhexp  log of household expenditure (t=1)  -0.9570*** 
(0.0920) 












trust  1  if  believed  “trust”  deteriorated  has  been 
deteriorated in the community 
-0.5619  
(0.2440) 




  Wald χ2(11)   75.95***  χ2(10), 0.55***  60.53***  55.63*** 
  LR test of rho= 0:  χ2 (1)  -  1.51  1.51  - 
  Log likelihood  -526.30558    -525.55202  -524.8016 
  Pseudo R2  0.2884  -  -  - 
  Number of obs.          2010  1608  2010  2010 This signals the number of replications used (R=150) is 
sufficient. In general, the inclusion of autocorrelation in 
the simulated Heckman model improves efficiency of 
the random effect specification. 
All of the pre-survey instruments are significant 
at acceptable critical levels. The indicator for reluctance 
to  adopt  new  methods,  which  also  captures  risk-
perception  (nointerest),  and  the  indicator  for  future 
access  to  credit  (accss_value)  are  both  highly 
significant  and  with  expected  parameter  sign.  Those 
uninterested to adopt new ways of doing things such as 
the  agricultural  extension  program  are  less  likely  to 
borrow; and those who think losing future access due to 
default is the highest punishment and hence value future 
access  to  credit  most  are  more  likely  to  keep  their 
relationship with the MFI by continuing to borrow. This 
is  in  line  with  the  state  dependence  implied  by  the 
significance  of  the  lagged  dependent  parameter. 
Parameters for availability of a reliable partner and the 
general  perception  on  trust  are  also  significant.  Both 
capture the ‘income risk’ associated with joint-liability 
contract. The higher the chances of obtaining a reliable 
and  trusted  partner,  the  more  likely  to  joint  a  joint-
liability contract. Age has non-linear relationship with 
the probability of borrowing: age and age-squared are 
both  significant  but  age-squared  is  with  negative 
parameter sign indicating that the probability of being 
in a borrowing relationship declines with age.  
Another  important  variable  of  interest  is 
proximity to market (mrkt), which is positively highly 
significantly  influencing  the  probability  borrowing. 
This variable takes up not only market proximity but 
also  geographical  (infrastructural)  differences  among 
villages  because  our  coding  for  market  access 
coincidentally  correlates  with  these  geographic 
differences among zones. Besides, the shocks related to 
the  conflict  with  Eritrea  had  significant  effects  on 
borrowing probability. The further away a village from 
the conflict zone, the more likely to borrow.  
In  sum,  other  things  remaining  the  same, 
households’  valuations  of  future  access  to  credit, 
perceptions on risk of exogenous shocks and resilience 
to cope with shocks, availability of trusted and reliable 





This paper dealt with what explains the probability of 
borrowing from a joint-liability based MFI. The novelty 
in  this  paper  is  that  credit  contract  is  seen  within  a 
whole  mark  of  dynamic  household  production-
consumption-wealth  accumulation  decisions  rather  than 
singled out as a separate household decision variable. An 
important finding in this paper is that the contractual risk of 
borrowing does matter in borrowing and ensuring physical 
availability of credit through MFIs without improving its 
contractual  risks  may  be  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient 
condition  to  improve  credit  access  in  poor  and  risky 
environments.  Providing  a  full-fledged  credit  services, 
including credit for consumption, might help to cope with 
risk  after  shock  and  thus  encourage  households  to  use 
credit as a tool to tackle poverty. Another important finding 
is  that  household  who  happened  to  participate  tend  to 
repeat  borrowing  than  other  wise.  It  might  be  that  the 
perceived  threat  of  punishment  and  perceived  risks  are 
higher than are in reality. The implication is that policies 
that ease these risks and threats might help to encourage 
households  to  come  forward  and  use  credit.  Use  of 
extensive panel data and recent panel data techniques help 
to  overcome  estimation  difficulties  often  faced  in 
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